Reference
Drones and air taxis, airlines and airports, business and general aviation, and the airspace around them. Every entry has a permanent code and its own link you can share.
Airliners, the airports that turn them, and the systems behind every departure.
AIR-A.1
Counterfeit satellite signals can shift an aircraft's position, set off false terrain warnings, and leave crews flying on backup systems for the rest of the trip.
DOR checks the position where it enters the aircraft's systems, against what the aircraft can verify for itself, and holds a fix that fails before navigation uses it.
AIR-A.2
GPS also tells an aircraft what time it is, and spoofed time can corrupt logs and every check that depends on them.
DOR checks time where it enters and keeps the true order of events.
AIR-A.3
Text messages between dispatch, air traffic control, and the flight deck can be faked or altered in transit.
DOR proves each message came from the station that claims it and has not changed since.
AIR-A.4
Navigation data and flight plans are loaded before every flight, and a changed waypoint or procedure can sit unnoticed.
DOR checks the data when it arrives and again when it loads.
AIR-A.5
Aircraft load software into avionics like any other part.
DOR proves each software part came from its maker and holds one that does not match before it installs.
AIR-A.6
Tablets on the flight deck carry charts, performance data, and weight and balance.
DOR proves the data on the tablet is the data that was approved.
AIR-A.7
A changed load sheet or fuel figure feeds directly into takeoff performance.
DOR proves the figures came from the system that produced them and were not changed on the way to the crew.
AIR-A.8
Parts sold with falsified release certificates can reach engines and landing gear.
DOR checks a certificate's origin before the part is accepted and keeps its history provable.
AIR-A.9
Maintenance records decide whether an aircraft is airworthy, and records can be backdated or quietly edited.
DOR locks in what was done, by whom, and in what order.
AIR-A.10
Check-in, boarding, and baggage systems are shared by many airlines at once, so one attack can stop an airport.
DOR keeps a record of every setting and change that cannot be edited, so recovery starts from verified ground.
AIR-A.11
Support connections into airport and airline systems can be used to issue changes nobody approved.
DOR checks where each command came from, not just whether the login was valid.
AIR-A.12
A cloned voice can call operations control or a crew room posing as a manager.
DOR checks the live call and flags a voice it cannot verify.
Business jets, charter operators, flight schools, and the people who fly and maintain them.
AIR-B.1
Business jets and training aircraft fly the same spoofed regions as airliners, often with fewer backup systems.
DOR checks the position before the flight deck uses it, on equipment already aboard.
AIR-B.2
Cabin Wi-Fi and passenger devices share an aircraft with systems that fly it.
DOR checks what crosses from the cabin side before anything on the aircraft side acts on it.
AIR-B.3
Fake instructions to change bank details or booking terms cost charter operators and brokers heavily.
DOR confirms the sender before anyone acts on the request.
AIR-B.4
An aircraft's value rests on its logbooks, and records can be altered before a sale.
DOR keeps every entry provable from the day it was written.
AIR-B.5
Business and general aviation crews plan from third-party data feeds.
DOR proves the plan and the weather came from their source unchanged.
AIR-B.6
Updates to avionics often travel on cards and drives through maintenance shops.
DOR only allows registered devices and checks every update before it installs.
Drones, the agencies and companies that fly them, and the air taxis coming behind them.
AIR-U.1
A drone can be taken over through its control link.
DOR checks every command on the aircraft itself, no matter which link carried it.
AIR-U.2
Spoofed signals can steer a drone into restricted airspace or onto the ground.
DOR checks the position on board and holds navigation to what it can verify.
AIR-U.3
Drones broadcast an identity and position, and that broadcast can be faked or cloned.
DOR proves which broadcasts came from the aircraft that claims them.
AIR-U.4
Drone video from police and fire calls becomes evidence.
DOR proves where each recording came from and that nothing changed, from capture to courtroom.
AIR-U.5
Drone flights depend on approvals passed between operators and airspace service providers.
DOR proves each approval came from the service that issued it.
AIR-U.6
One command to a fleet of delivery or inspection drones reaches every aircraft at once.
DOR verifies fleet commands on each aircraft before it acts.
AIR-U.7
A firmware update can carry changes that turn a drone against its operator.
DOR checks updates before they install and watches for changes beyond what was approved.
AIR-U.8
Utilities and insurers act on drone inspection images and readings.
DOR attaches provable origin to every image and reading.
AIR-U.9
Drones flown beyond visual line of sight rely on links and systems the pilot cannot see.
DOR keeps checking on board when the link drops, with no outside service.
AIR-U.10
Air taxis will fly by wire, under fleet operations centers, into vertiports.
DOR verifies commands at the speed flight controls work and keeps every fleet instruction provable.
AIR-U.11
A drone that is lost or captured can be put back into the fleet with changes.
DOR notices when a device has changed and flags it before it rejoins.
The surveillance, voice, and data systems that keep aircraft apart. Engagement on these systems runs through the DOR Government page.
AIR-T.1
Aircraft broadcast their own position in the clear, so a transmitter on the ground can place aircraft that do not exist on a controller's screen.
DOR proves which broadcasts came from the aircraft that claim them.
AIR-T.2
An impostor on a control frequency can issue instructions that sound authentic.
DOR flags a voice transmission it cannot verify without stopping any transmission from going out.
AIR-T.3
Notices to air missions and weather reports reach crews and controllers through many hands.
DOR proves each notice and report came from its source unchanged.
AIR-T.4
Spoofed GPS shifts the positions aircraft report, and every system that tracks them inherits the error.
DOR checks reported positions against what each system can verify for itself.
AIR-T.5
Old position reports can be replayed or delayed to hide where aircraft actually are.
DOR rejects reports it has already seen and flags data that arrives late.
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Everything that flies acts on what it is told. DOR proves it first. Innovations for an unseen future.