Power and the Grid
Generation, transmission, and distribution, from the control room to the substation to the solar field.
CI-P.1
False readings on control room screens
Operator screens can be made to show normal values while equipment is driven toward failure.
DOR's answerDOR proves each reading came from the device it names, unchanged, so an altered display is caught before anyone acts on it.
CI-P.2
Unauthorized commands to grid equipment
Anyone who reaches the control network can send commands to open breakers, change setpoints, or shut down units.
DOR's answerDOR holds any command it cannot prove came from an authorized source before it reaches the equipment.
CI-P.3
Fake GPS time in substations
Protection relays and grid measurements set their clocks by GPS, and a radio signal can shift that time without touching the network.
DOR's answerDOR checks time where it enters and holds a source that fails, so protection acts on the true time.
CI-P.4
Hijacked links to remote generation
Wind, solar, and battery sites are controlled over cellular and radio links.
DOR's answerDOR verifies every command and setpoint itself, no matter which link carried it.
CI-P.5
Swapped or cloned field devices
A controller or meter can be replaced with a device that copies its identity.
DOR's answerDOR confirms the device is the registered one while it operates.
CI-P.6
Equipment with undocumented functions
Hardware can arrive with parts or communication paths that were never documented.
DOR's answerDOR watches equipment while it runs, so behavior outside what was approved is flagged and recorded.