Critical Infrastructure Reference.

The ways power, water, and pipeline systems get fooled, in plain language, and what DOR does about each one.

Power and the Grid

Generation, transmission, and distribution, from the control room to the substation to the solar field.

CI-P.1

False readings on control room screens

Operator screens can be made to show normal values while equipment is driven toward failure.

DOR's answer

DOR proves each reading came from the device it names, unchanged, so an altered display is caught before anyone acts on it.

RA-1.2.4RA-1.2.2

CI-P.2

Unauthorized commands to grid equipment

Anyone who reaches the control network can send commands to open breakers, change setpoints, or shut down units.

DOR's answer

DOR holds any command it cannot prove came from an authorized source before it reaches the equipment.

RA-2.1.4RA-1.3.1

CI-P.3

Fake GPS time in substations

Protection relays and grid measurements set their clocks by GPS, and a radio signal can shift that time without touching the network.

DOR's answer

DOR checks time where it enters and holds a source that fails, so protection acts on the true time.

RA-5.1.1RA-5.1.2RA-5.1.3

CI-P.4

Hijacked links to remote generation

Wind, solar, and battery sites are controlled over cellular and radio links.

DOR's answer

DOR verifies every command and setpoint itself, no matter which link carried it.

RA-2.1.1RA-2.1.3

CI-P.5

Swapped or cloned field devices

A controller or meter can be replaced with a device that copies its identity.

DOR's answer

DOR confirms the device is the registered one while it operates.

RA-1.2.3RA-3.1.2

CI-P.6

Equipment with undocumented functions

Hardware can arrive with parts or communication paths that were never documented.

DOR's answer

DOR watches equipment while it runs, so behavior outside what was approved is flagged and recorded.

RA-3.3.3RA-4.4.2

Water and Wastewater

Treatment plants, towers, and lift stations, most of them run by small teams.

CI-W.1

Changed controller programs

Attackers can download a plant controller's program, change it, and load it back.

DOR's answer

DOR checks control programs before they load and holds any that do not match what was approved.

RA-1.3.3RA-2.2.2

CI-W.2

Disabled alarms and shutdowns

Alarm and shutdown logic can be switched off quietly, so a problem grows with no warning.

DOR's answer

DOR confirms the logic running is the approved logic and records any change, who made it, and why.

RA-4.1.3RA-4.1.4

CI-W.3

Altered treatment readings

A false pressure, flow, or chemical reading can hide a problem or start a needless shutdown.

DOR's answer

DOR proves each reading is unaltered from the sensor to the screen.

RA-1.2.2RA-1.3.2

CI-W.4

Commands over cellular modems

Towers and lift stations are often run over cellular links that attackers can reach.

DOR's answer

DOR verifies each command at the site where it arrives.

RA-2.1.1RA-D.2

CI-W.5

Protection that depends on an outside service

Many protections stop working when the service they check with cannot be reached.

DOR's answer

DOR depends on no outside service, so it keeps working on small and isolated systems.

RA-D.3RA-D.2

Oil, Gas, and Pipelines

Wells, pipelines, and terminals controlled across hundreds of miles.

CI-G.1

Dangerous commands to field controllers

Commands to open, close, stop, or override can cause spills, fires, or injuries.

DOR's answer

DOR holds any command it cannot prove before the equipment acts on it.

RA-2.1.4

CI-G.2

Replayed or delayed commands

A valid command can be recorded and sent again later, or held back until conditions change.

DOR's answer

DOR knows what it has already received and when each command was sent, so a repeated or stale command fails.

RA-5.2.1RA-5.2.2

CI-G.3

Altered leak detection data

Pressure and flow readings can be changed on the way to the control room, hiding a leak or forcing a shutdown.

DOR's answer

DOR proves each reading is unaltered.

RA-1.2.2RA-1.3.2

CI-G.4

Disputed measurement records

Meter and custody transfer records can be changed or backdated.

DOR's answer

DOR locks in what was measured and when, so a record can be defended.

RA-5.3.1RA-6.3.1

Across Every Site

The ways in that every operator shares.

CI-X.1

Remote access beyond what was approved

Vendor and integrator logins can be used for more than the job they were granted.

DOR's answer

DOR holds actions outside what was approved and requires a name and a reason for each one.

RA-2.2.1RA-2.4.2RA-6.3.2

CI-X.2

Unregistered laptops and USB drives

Engineering laptops and USB drives can carry malware straight to controllers.

DOR's answer

DOR accepts only registered devices and records every attempt to use another.

RA-3.3.1RA-3.3.2

CI-X.3

Malicious updates and firmware

Updates and firmware can carry harmful code that passes ordinary checks.

DOR's answer

DOR checks them before they install and keeps checking what runs.

RA-2.2.2RA-4.1.1

CI-X.4

Erased or edited logs

After a break-in, logs are often edited or deleted.

DOR's answer

DOR's record of what your systems received and did cannot be edited or deleted.

RA-4.3.2RA-6.1.3RA-5.3.2

CI-X.5

Impostor calls and orders

An urgent call or message from someone posing as a supervisor, vendor, or agency can push an operator to act.

DOR's answer

DOR confirms the sender before the request is acted on, including a cloned voice on a live call.

RA-2.4.1RA-3.2.2

Critical Infrastructure

Start with a briefing.

Bring your control system diagram, or just the questions keeping your operators up at night. DOR will show you exactly where it fits.