MI-F.1
Commands from unauthorized sources
Anyone who reaches the plant network can send a controller a command in the right format.
DOR proves each command came from an authorized source.
The ways controllers, robots, quality data, parts, and design files get altered or faked, in plain language, and what DOR does about each one.
Controllers, operator screens, recipes, and the setpoints that run every line.
MI-F.1
Anyone who reaches the plant network can send a controller a command in the right format.
DOR proves each command came from an authorized source.
MI-F.2
A valid command can be recorded and sent again later to start or stop a machine.
DOR knows what was already received, so the repeat fails.
MI-F.3
Setpoints and recipes can be changed a little at a time until a batch is ruined.
DOR holds changes that do not come from an authorized person and records each one.
MI-F.4
Operator screens can show normal readings while a process is driven out of control.
DOR checks readings before they reach screens and alarms.
Industrial robots, CNC machines, and the programs that move them.
MI-M.1
A robot program can be changed to move a path, a speed, or a force.
DOR proves the program running is the approved one.
MI-M.2
Robots accept commands from controllers, pendants, and networked software.
DOR confirms the source of each command before the robot moves.
MI-M.3
A CNC program can be altered so a part looks right and fails later.
DOR checks each program before it loads.
MI-M.4
Security tools that block traffic can block a safety signal too.
DOR never holds an emergency stop, interlock, or safety controller.
Test results, inspection data, and the records that follow every part.
MI-Q.1
Test results can be edited or substituted after they are measured.
DOR proves each result came from its instrument and has not changed.
MI-Q.2
A certificate can be forged or reused for a lot it does not describe.
DOR keeps certificates provable and tied to the lot they cover.
MI-Q.3
Records can be edited after a lot ships, which breaks traceability when it matters most.
DOR keeps every version and who changed it.
Components, firmware, supplier files, and the vendors who connect from outside.
MI-S.1
Counterfeit parts and swapped controllers can enter through the supply chain or a repair.
DOR confirms the hardware while it runs.
MI-S.2
An update can carry harmful code and still pass a signature check.
DOR checks updates before they install and watches for changes beyond what was approved.
MI-S.3
Remote access tools give vendors a path into the plant, and attackers use the same path.
DOR requires a named reason for each session and records it.
MI-S.4
USB drives still move programs and data on many plant floors.
DOR allows only registered devices and records every attempt.
CAD models, 3D printing build files, digital twins, and AI on the line.
MI-D.1
A design file can be changed on its way from engineering to a supplier or machine.
DOR proves the file is the one engineering released.
MI-D.2
A build file can be altered to leave hidden voids or weak layers.
DOR checks build files before the printer runs them.
MI-D.3
AI that inspects parts or tunes a process can be swapped or fed altered inputs.
DOR confirms the model and ties each result to what produced it.
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Manufacturing and Industrial
Bring your line, your machines, and the incident your team still talks about, or just the question they keep asking. DOR will show you exactly where it fits.