The ways core, cell site, subscriber, and call systems get fooled, in plain language, and what DOR does about each one.
The messages carriers exchange to find phones, route calls, and connect to each other.
TEL-C.1
A party with leased signaling access can pose as a carrier and ask your network where a phone is or where its calls should go.
DOR confirms each request came from the operator it names before your core answers.
TEL-C.2
A valid signaling message can be sent again, or arrive from somewhere it could not have come from.
DOR knows what it has already received and checks each message against where it could come from.
TEL-C.3
A forged route or a changed interconnect setting can send traffic through someone else's network.
DOR checks each change against its source before it takes effect.
TEL-C.4
A network function can be swapped or modified while it keeps running.
DOR confirms the software running is the approved build.
Towers, small cells, femtocells, and the clocks that keep them in step.
TEL-A.1
A small cell or femtocell built with a cloned certificate can join the network as if it were yours.
DOR verifies each cell by more than its certificate.
TEL-A.2
A rogue station can broadcast as part of your network and pull phones onto it.
DOR checks what the network hears against its own record of its sites.
TEL-A.3
Cell sites take time from satellites, and that signal can be faked or jammed.
DOR checks time where it enters and keeps the site on verified time.
TEL-A.4
Radios and site equipment can be swapped or altered in the field.
DOR confirms each unit is the one you installed.
Who a number belongs to, and who is allowed to move it.
TEL-S.1
A number can be moved to an attacker's SIM by an impostor or an insider.
DOR confirms the request came from the account holder before the number moves.
TEL-S.2
SIM keys and subscriber identities can be copied or changed.
DOR keeps every change provable and flags one that did not come through an authorized path.
TEL-S.3
Thousands of SIMs run by one operator can pass as thousands of customers.
DOR ties traffic to the devices and accounts behind it.
The caller ID, the text, and the voice on the line.
TEL-V.1
A number can be shown on a call that never came from it, sometimes with the highest rating attached.
DOR proves where the call came from.
TEL-V.2
A cloned voice can call a customer, a help desk, or an executive.
DOR confirms who is on the call while it is happening.
TEL-V.3
Texts carrying codes and alerts can be faked, intercepted, or changed.
DOR proves where each one came from and that it arrived unchanged.
Network changes, privileged access, and the record you answer for.
TEL-O.1
Systems built for court-ordered intercepts and network administration can be used by impostors or misused by insiders.
DOR requires a verified request and a recorded reason for every use.
TEL-O.2
A configuration change can open a door and look routine.
DOR checks every change against who approved it.
TEL-O.3
After a break-in, logs are often edited or deleted.
DOR's record of what your network received and did cannot be edited or deleted.
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Telecommunications
Bring your network map and your vendor list, or just the question your security team keeps asking. DOR will show you exactly where it fits.
