The ways vehicles, vessels, drones, trains, and freight systems get fooled, in plain language, and what DOR does about each one.
Trucks, cars, buses, and the telematics that connect them.
TL-V.1
An attacker who reaches a vehicle's internal network can send commands to steering, braking, or the engine.
DOR proves each command came from an authorized source before the vehicle acts on it, and the driver always keeps control.
TL-V.2
An altered software update can reach every vehicle in a fleet at once.
DOR verifies each update before installation and confirms what is running afterward.
TL-V.3
Location, hours, and engine readings can be faked or edited before they reach dispatch and compliance systems.
DOR proves each reading came from the vehicle that claims it, unaltered.
TL-V.4
A telematics unit or controller can be swapped or cloned to pass as the original.
DOR confirms each unit is the one you installed.
Ships, workboats, terminals, and the systems that steer and load them.
TL-S.1
Autopilots, joystick systems, and engine controls act on commands they cannot verify.
DOR proves each command came from the helm or an authorized system, and the person at the helm always keeps control.
TL-S.2
A false GPS signal can move a ship's position on the chart, and AIS reports can claim a vessel is somewhere it is not.
DOR checks position data where it enters and keeps verified reports apart from unverified broadcasts.
TL-S.3
Instructions to load, release, or reroute cargo can be forged.
DOR proves each one came from an authorized source before cargo moves.
Drones, aircraft operations, and the navigation they rely on.
TL-D.1
A drone can be sent commands by someone who is not its operator.
DOR verifies the source of every command before the drone acts, whatever link carried it.
TL-D.2
GPS can be jammed or faked, and backup navigation can be fooled in turn.
DOR checks navigation data where it enters and keeps backup sources honest.
TL-D.3
A flight or maintenance record can be changed after it was signed.
DOR's record cannot be edited, so a change stands out.
TL-D.4
Drone firmware and software updates can be altered to add hidden behavior or a remote shutoff.
DOR verifies each update before it installs and confirms what is running in flight.
Signals, train control, and the systems riders see.
TL-R.1
A train control or signaling command can be forged, or a genuine one sent again at the wrong time.
DOR proves each command is authentic and current before it reaches the equipment.
TL-R.2
Schedules, departure boards, and announcements can be changed to mislead riders.
DOR proves each update came from the operator.
Loads, bookings, documents, and the people who move them.
TL-F.1
A booking, rate confirmation, or dispatch message can come from someone posing as a carrier or broker.
DOR proves who sent it before a load is tendered or released.
TL-F.2
Bills of lading and delivery receipts can be forged or changed.
DOR keeps each document provable from the moment it is created.
TL-F.3
Attackers who take over a dispatcher's computer or load board account can act as the company.
DOR verifies the person and system behind each action, beyond the login.
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Transportation and Logistics
Bring your fleet list and the systems that dispatch it, or just the question your operations team keeps asking. DOR will show you exactly where it fits.
